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THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF
PACKS: APPLYING THE ANTITRUST
CONSPIRACY FRAMEWORK TO SECTION 13(D)
ACTIVIST GROUP FORMATION
William R. Tevlin*
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that
acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their
holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whether a group is
formed under section 13(d) often is unclear. The legal precedent is
ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial
evidence than others without explaining why. With the substantial increase
of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity
or uniformity is necessary. A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge
funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation
while intentionally avoiding group status under section 13(d).
Rather than develop a new rule, courts should apply the antitrust
conspiracy framework from section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
antitrust precedent identifies conscious parallelism and plus factors as
evidence of price-fixing conspiracies. It is based on statutory language,
and courts are familiar with the precedent, largely because the case law is
similar to section 13(d) law. This Note provides a survey of the modern
section 13(d) group formation landscape and addresses certain forms of
circumstantial evidence that apply to the wolf pack strategy. This Note then
advocates that courts should apply the antitrust precedent to section 13(d)
as a two-part solution: first by utilizing conscious parallelism and second
by considering novel plus factors. Finally, this Note suggests plus factors
that would be useful in identifying when wolf packs form 13(d) groups while
avoiding overpunishing those wolf packs.
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INTRODUCTION
In the current hedge fund activism era, shareholder disclosure rules in the
United States are alarmingly vague and, therefore, require a clear legal
formula.1 Activism is shareholder conduct for the purpose of instituting
change within a company without taking actual control of the company.2
Hedge funds—as opposed to traditional shareholders—are playing a larger
role in activist campaigns.3 Shareholders, including activists, who acquire
5 percent or more of an issuer’s stock must file a Schedule 13D with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under section 13(d) of the
Williams Act.4 Further, a “group” of investors who collectively own 5
percent or more of a company’s stock is required jointly to file a Schedule
13D.5
A “group” is formed when investors act together, or “[agree] to act
together[,] for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting[,] or disposing of”
an issuer’s securities.6 In each case, whether a group is formed is a
question of fact.7 There is no checklist of factors that courts use to
determine the existence of a 13(d) group.8 This has led courts to place
differing weights on evidentiary categories of group activity without
explaining why.9
Activist hedge funds seek to avoid the 13(d) disclosure requirement.10
This has contributed to the rise of the wolf pack investment strategy. A
“wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel
activist strategies toward a target corporation while intentionally avoiding
group status under section 13(d).11 Wolf packs have proved wildly
1. See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Transatlantic
Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch121511mls.htm (“We think it’s important to modernize our rules, and we are
considering whether they should be changed in light of modern investment strategies . . . .”)
[https://perma.cc/KZC7-A3V7].
2. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism As a Corrective
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1017.
3. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at Tulane University Law School 27th
Annual Corporate Law Institute: A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015 (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html#_ftnref5
[https://perma.cc/Y2GT-NLZB].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012).
5. See id. § 78m(d)(3).
6. See Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2001).
7. See id. at 124.
8. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the varied importance that courts place on evidence
categories).
10. See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (noting the reasons hedge funds avoid
filing Schedule 13Ds).
11. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 28 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
521, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656325 [https://perma.cc/VC53-L2J2].
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successful, both in implementing change in their targets and garnering
profits for their members.12 One example of a successful campaign is a
wolf pack led by Jana Partners that forced PetSmart into a leveraged buyout
in 2014.13 There, the hedge funds cumulatively owned less than 20 percent
of PetSmart, but received a windfall of an almost 40 percent return on their
investment.14
Scholars are divided on the benefits and disadvantages that hedge fund
activism provides to both corporations and the economy.15 This debate
focuses on whether activism provides long-term value to targeted
companies.16 Regardless, both sides agree that not all activism is
positive.17 Even renowned activist Carl Icahn said, “We definitely do not
believe that all activism today is [] good . . . . There are bad activists, and
we agree that it’s bad. All they want to do is get in and rock the boat and
make a quick trade.”18 This uncertainty and potential for abuse makes it
essential that courts have a clear checklist of factors to use when
determining 13(d) group formation.
While securities laws have not yet developed in this area, established
antitrust law principles can serve as a model for this analysis. Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act seeks to prevent price-fixing conspiracies among
competitors.19 Antitrust litigation often centers on whether defendants
entered into an agreement.20 To prove a conspiracy, plaintiffs must show
the existence of both conscious parallelism and plus factors—evidence that
“tends to exclude” the probability that defendants acted independently.21
The antitrust precedent would also be useful in the section 13(d) group
context because courts are applying a statute that requires them to find an
agreement.22 Given the similarities that exist between these laws,23 courts
would benefit from applying the antitrust doctrine to 13(d) group formation.
Therefore, this Note proposes a two-part solution: courts should apply the
conscious parallelism standard as the first element and then consider novel
12. See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (discussing the success of the wolf
pack strategy).
13. See Karlee Weinmann, BC Partners Offers $8.7B for PetSmart in 2014’s Biggest
LBO, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/604572/bcpartners-offers-8-7b-for-petsmart-in-2014-s-biggest-lbo [https://perma.cc/F24K-2ECP].
14. See id.
15. See White, supra note 3.
16. See infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (noting the competing arguments
between legal scholars and practitioners).
17. See David Benoit & Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining
American Companies?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:55 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712
[https://
perma.cc/MTM9-ALLE].
18. Id.
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
20. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110
MICH. L. REV. 393, 399 (2011).
21. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 69 (2010) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST LAW].
22. Antitrust cases regarding price-fixing conspiracies often focus on whether an
agreement was formed. Kovacic et al., supra note 20, at 399.
23. See infra Part II.A (discussing the similarities between these doctrines).

2016]

THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF PACKS

2339

plus factors that are circumstantial evidence of wolf pack group formation.
The conscious parallelism and plus factor standard of circumstantial
evidence from antitrust law provides the more certain solution that section
13(d) needs.
Part I of this Note discusses section 13(d) of the Williams Act, activist
investing, and the legal determinants of what constitutes a 13(d) group.
Part II analyzes the weight assigned to categories of circumstantial evidence
of group activity by courts, as well as the antitrust framework used to prove
a price-fixing conspiracy. Finally, Part III suggests that the conscious
parallelism standard should be adopted in wolf pack group formation cases
and explores the plus factors that could be utilized in section 13(d) litigation
without overpunishing wolf packs.
I. THE INTERPLAY OF SECTION 13(D)
GROUP FORMATION AND HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
This part explains section 13(d) and its significance to hedge fund
activism. Part I.A discusses the Williams Act and the purpose of section
13(d) in securities law, specifically when shareholders act as a group. Part
I.B surveys activist investing, while focusing on the significance of wolf
packs. Part I.C illustrates the vagueness of laws concerning 13(d) group
formation. Finally, Part I.D describes the consequences of forming a group
and the importance of developing a more certain evaluative framework.
A. The Williams Act
Added as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1968,
the Williams Act governs acquisitions and tender offers.24 Section 13(d)
requires persons who acquire beneficial ownership of 5 percent or more of
any public company to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC within ten days.25
A Schedule 13D must state the filer’s identity, funding source, investment
purpose, number of shares, and information about contracts, arrangements,
or understandings with another person pertaining to the target company.26
When two or more persons act as a group, they are treated as a single
person under section 13(d).27 The SEC defined “group” when it codified
the Williams Act.28 Rule 13d-5(b)(1) states that a group is formed “[w]hen
two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, voting or disposing of” a target’s stock.29 Section 16(b) uses the
same definition of “group” as 13(d).30 Therefore, this Note will also
24. See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1970).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2015).
26. See id.
27. See id. § 78m(d)(3).
28. See Portsmouth Square Inc. v. S’holders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 873 (9th
Cir. 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2016).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (emphasis added).
30. See id. § 240.16a-1(a)(1); see also Howard O. Godnick & William H. Gussman, Jr.,
Beware the Counterattack Against Activist Investors: The Group Trap, ACTIVIST INVESTING
DEV., Fall 2006, at 1.
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examine section 16(b) group cases to determine what constitutes a group
under section 13(d).31
The purpose of section 13(d) is to provide a tool by which a corporation’s
shareholders and incumbent management receive notice when a large
amount of shares are purchased.32 The statute was intended to ensure that
investors remained informed, while giving incumbent management an
opportunity to expound its position.33 However, Congress recognized that
shareholder activism can be useful to poorly run businesses and therefore
did not intend the law to favor incumbent management or activist
investors.34
B. Activist Investing and the Rise of Wolf Packs
Long gone are the 1980s, which were full of corporate raiders.35 Today,
raiders are rebranding themselves as activist investors.36 The traditional
rationale for shareholder activism is to correct agency problems that arise in
Activist shareholders can redirect corporate
public corporations.37
governance when boards of directors or management become ineffective,
opportunistic, or lazy.38
Shareholders who are dissatisfied with the direction of their corporation
have two choices: exit the company by selling their equity or become an
active voice in the corporation to effectuate change.39 Those shareholders
who choose to become active participants generally are motivated by the
opportunity to improve the value of their investments.40
Traditional activists concentrate on expanding shareholder rights.41
Generally, these activists hold relatively few shares and employ subtle
31. Section 16(b) applies to directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than 10
percent of a security and requires them to disgorge any short-swing profits earned from the
sale or purchase of that security. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)–(b).
32. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 901711, at 4 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813; S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 3–4
(1967).
34. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 48–59; H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 4, as reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813; S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 3–4.
35. See David Futrelle, Corporate Raiders Beware: A Short History of the “Poison
Pill” Takeover Defense, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate
-raiders-beware-a-short-history-of-the-poison-pill-takeover-defense/ [https://perma.cc/854RN83C].
36. See 60 Minutes: The Icahn Lift: 60 Minutes’ Lesley Stahl Profiles the Billionaire
Investor (CBS television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/theicahn-lift-2/ [https://perma.cc/R86L-J92H].
37. See MARION F. HARTMANN, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS 7
(2014) (ebook).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 5.
40. See id. at 6–7.
41. See Marco Becht et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International
Study 8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 (noting that this is accomplished by dismantling
shareholder rights plans, implementing cumulative voting, and changing corporate
responsibility policies) [https://perma.cc/DV7J-MQCH].
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methods to induce change, including writing letters to corporations’ board
and management, participating in shareholders’ meetings, and talking to the
press.42 Holding a small number of shares relegates traditional activists to
being voices that advocate for change, rather than being vehicles that effect
change.43
In recent years, hedge funds have become the most distinguished activist
investors.44 These institutional investors can provide tremendous value to a
target corporation by effecting change.45 In contrast to traditional activist
shareholders, hedge funds have vast amounts of capital.46 Hedge fund
activists aim to control a target corporation’s business strategy and
management directly.47 Additionally, hedge funds take more involved steps
to influence corporate strategy than traditional activists.48 Activist hedge
funds predominantly employ one of three strategies: push the target to be
acquired by another corporation at a premium rate, push the target to spin
off its assets, or push the target to pay dividends to their shareholders.49
News of a hedge fund activism campaign causes the target’s stock price to
rise,50 as investors expect that activists will improve the performance of
target corporations.51
Activist hedge funds have been particularly effective in their
implementation of the wolf pack tactic. Generally, a wolf pack includes a
lead hedge fund that acquires a larger stake in the target and smaller hedge
funds that provide support to the lead wolf.52 The lead activist buys equity
in a target corporation and then tips off other hedge funds regarding its
plans.53 Generally, these tips are done behind closed doors,54 but

42. See id. at 9.
43. See HARTMANN, supra note 37, at 5.
44. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007).
45. See GEORGE P. SCHWARTZ, SHAREHOLDER REBELLION: HOW INVESTORS ARE
CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA’S COMPANIES ARE RUN 57 (1995).
46. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 9.
47. See id. at 8–9 (noting that hedge funds aim to induce spin-offs, the sale of
subsidiaries, the overhaul of balance sheets, payouts to shareholders, and changes to
corporate governance); Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1029 (stating that activist hedge
funds demand changes to business strategy, run proxy contests over current or additional
board seats, and bring lawsuits against past and present management).
48. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 9 (noting that these steps include requesting
meetings with corporate management and threatening changes to boards of directors or
litigation).
49. See HARTMANN, supra note 37, at 15.
50. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2015).
51. See id.
52. See Alon Brav et al., Wolf Pack Activism 3–4 (Robert H. Smith Sch., Working Paper
No. RHS 2529230, 2015) [hereinafter Wolf Pack Activism], http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2529230 [https://perma.cc/ZNG8-EKFN]. The lead wolf usually will be the one to speak
on behalf of all of the wolves. Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund
Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 491 (2013).
53. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 34. Tipping leads other activist funds to
invest in the target, which strengthens the wolf pack’s leverage. See id. These tips are not
considered insider trading because the hedge funds owe no fiduciary duty to the target. See
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sometimes hedge funds tip the media55 or announce their investments
during presentations at activist conferences.56 If a hedge fund acquires
more than 5 percent of a target’s stock, the wolf pack is formed during the
ten-day window preceding the Schedule 13D’s filing.57 This strategy is
appealing to hedge funds because each can purchase a small share in a
target—oftentimes less than 5 percent—but their combined stake will be
significant.58 In order to maximize profits, these activist campaigns are
relatively short; once a wolf pack achieves its objective, its members sell
their shares and move on to their next targets.59
There are several reasons hedge funds avoid becoming a group.60 First, a
lawsuit alleging 13(d) group status can be very costly for a group’s
members to defend.61 Every hedge fund seeks to avoid cutting into profits.
Second, avoiding filing a Schedule 13D can increase profits. A hedge
fund may purchase up to 5 percent of the target corporation’s stock largely
undetected and, therefore, at a lower cost.62 Upon crossing the 5 percent
equity threshold, the ten-day window allowed by section 13(d) begins.63
While the target’s stock price may have risen since crossing the 5 percent
threshold, it generally will be cheaper during this time than after the
Schedule 13D is filed and the market is alerted to the acquisition.64 Thus,
there is a large incentive to delay the ten-day window while the stock’s
value is low.
Finally, upon filing a Schedule 13D, the target corporation’s board of
directors is made aware of the investor’s identity. Directors have a right,
and are often encouraged, to employ defensive measures when they fear a

id. at 35 n.72 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983)).
54. See Susan Pulliam et al., Activist Investors Often Leak Their Plans to a Favored
Few, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304888404579381250791474792 [https://perma.cc/S8UY-KSPT].
55. See Richa Naidu, Starboard Takes Stake in Advance Auto, Urges Changes, REUTERS
(Sept. 30, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-starboard-value-advanceauto-idUSKCN0RU0AV20150930#dtGoVOwosASpppEa.97
[https://perma.cc/8APQWG4E].
56. See William Alden, Ackman Outlines Bet Against Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K
(Dec. 20, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ackman-outlines-betagainst-herbalife/ [https://perma.cc/YPC4-CKYC].
57. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 33–34. The ten-day window refers to the
ten days between when a shareholder crosses the 5 percent threshold and when the
shareholder must file a Schedule 13D under section 13(d). Id. at 32.
58. One study found that a wolf pack’s combined median stake is 17.21 percent of a
target’s stock. Katelouzou, supra note 52, at 491.
59. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence:
Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813, 825.
60. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 28.
61. See id. at 29. A lawsuit like this occurs when a target corporation alleges that hedge
funds formed a group that acquired over 5 percent of the target’s stock. See id.
62. See id.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012).
64. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 29.
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hostile takeover.65 Corporations tend to adopt a shareholder rights plan
(more commonly known as a “poison pill”) when facing this threat.66
Generally, poison pills provide that a “right” is distributed with each share
of an issuer’s common stock and that right remains with that stock until the
poison pill is triggered.67 The pill is triggered when an investor acquires an
identified percentage of the issuer’s common stock, determined by the
board.68 Once triggered, the rights holders are allowed to purchase
additional voting securities from the issuer at a steep discount.69 Poison
pills make a corporation an unattractive target by significantly diluting the
value of the acquirer’s voting power and the value of his shares if the pill is
triggered.70
Wolf packs are a particularly useful method to avoid triggering poison
pills. The average hedge fund that files a Schedule 13D reports owning
slightly less than 10 percent of the issuer’s stock.71 In a wolf pack, other
smaller hedge funds concurrently buy up the target corporation’s stock.72 A
standard poison pill is triggered when a person acquires 10 to 20 percent of
a company.73 So if the smaller wolf pack members acquire, in total, an
additional 12 to 15 percent during the ten-day window, the poison pill
would be trigged when the Schedule 13D is filed if those hedge funds
formed a group.74 Because each smaller member acquires less than 5
percent of the target, the wolf pack avoids triggering poison pills.
The rate of independent hedge fund activism and the use of the wolf pack
tactic have increased.75 Activist campaigns have a high probability of
65. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 2, at 1024; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 50,
at 1154. While hedge funds do not take a controlling share, the wolf pack is analogous to a
hostile takeover. See Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, Hedge Fund Activism Vs. Hostile
Takeover Bids 22 (Swedish House of Finance, Working Paper No. 15-04, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2585836 (suggesting that wolf packs are a substitute for hostile
tender offers) [https://perma.cc/5Z73-SQ7V].
66. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 30–31.
67. CHARLES E. SIMON & CO., CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL
DEVICE 1 (1997 ed., Clark Boardman Callaghan ed., 1997).
68. See id. at xv.
69. See id. at 1.
70. See id. at xv.
71. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors:
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2013) (finding that the average initial holding is
8.8 percent); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS
FINANCE 185, 203 (2010) (noting that the average initial holding is 5.3 to 8.8 percent);
Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge Funds As Shareholder Activists from
1994–2005, at 29 (July 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
fredgehm.com/images/boyson_mooradian_activism_FINAL.pdf (finding that the average
initial holding was 8.83 percent) [https://perma.cc/WC3W-7PXG].
72. See Wolf Pack Activism, supra note 52, at 5.
73. See Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons from
the American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438, 465 n.165 (2014).
74. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 31.
75. See id. at 2. This is in part due to high profit margins and reductions in the costs of
activism. See id. at 4. Costs have decreased due to the dwindling use of staggered boards,
changes in the powers of proxy advisors, and new SEC regulations. See id. at 18–26. Courts
have contributed to the increase of shareholder activism by reducing the punishments
available when section 13(d) is violated. See Daniel Reynolds, Recent Business Law Case:
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success.76 On average, these activist funds receive abnormally high returns
of 7 to 8 percent in the twenty days before and after filing a Schedule
13D.77 In the first six months of 2014, activist hedge funds outperformed
hedge funds as a group by over 3 percent.78
Wolf packs produce appreciably greater returns than endeavors waged by
single activist funds.79 Wolf packs have at least some success in 78 percent
of their campaigns, compared to only 46 percent success by hedge funds
acting independently.80 This amounts to wolf packs receiving, on average,
14 percent returns, while hedge funds acting independently receive only 6
percent returns.81
This success has led to a sharp increase in activist campaigns in the last
fifteen years.82 In 2014, activists initiated approximately 250 to 344
different public campaigns.83 In reality, many more corporations likely are
targeted each year, given that activists consistently report that public
campaigns represent less than a third of their total engagements.84
Moreover, activist hedge funds have begun targeting larger corporations.
In 2013, approximately one-third of all campaigns targeted corporations

CSX Corporation v. The Children’s Investment Fund, DRCHIFFRES (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://drchiffres.com/2014/10/19/recent-business-law-case-csx-corporation-v-the-childrensinvestment-fund/ [https://perma.cc/23LK-G8YK].
76. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 3 (finding that the probability of achieving success
is 53 percent globally and 61 percent in North America); see also ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 9 (Josh Black ed., 2015)
[hereinafter ACTIVIST INVESTING], http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/
20150130_ActivistInsight-SRZ.pdf (observing that 75 percent of activist campaigns were at
least “partially successful” in 2014, compared to 67 percent in 2013) [https://perma.cc/R37452PX]; Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that activist hedge funds won
nineteen of the twenty-four proxy contests they launched in 2013).
77. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 2 (finding 7 percent abnormal returns); see also
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63
J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (observing 7 to 8 percent abnormal returns).
78. See Rob Copeland, Returns from Activist Hedge Funds Are Causing a Stir, WALL
STREET J. (July 7, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/returns-from-activist-hedgefunds-are-causing-a-stir-1404773120 (noting that activist funds had a 6.5 percent rate of
return while hedge funds as a group had a 3.1 percent rate of return during that time)
[https://perma.cc/VU6J-WGJD].
79. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 5, 32, 59.
80. See id. at 32.
81. See id. at 5.
82. See Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, Activist-Strategic Buyer Tag-Teams:
A New Hostile Takeover Template?, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2015, at 14 (9th ed. 2015), http://www.wlrk.com/
webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23878.15.pdf (noting that twenty-seven public
activist campaigns occurred in 2000 compared to approximately 250 in 2014)
[https://perma.cc/QL43-CXCV].
83. See id.; ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that 344 public activist
campaigns occurred in 2014, compared to 291 in 2013). For the purpose of this Note, a
public campaign occurs when a hedge fund files a Schedule 13D or publicly announces its
investment.
84. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8.
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with a market capitalization of over $2 billion.85 Further, activist
campaigns are targeting more corporations with a market cap of over $10
billion than ever before.86 This is due in part to activist hedge funds’
increase in assets under management87 (AUM). Today, these funds manage
approximately $166 billion in assets, compared to only $23 billion in
2002.88 Some of these individual funds report AUMs over $10 billion.89
In 2014, wolf pack efforts were particularly successful. Apart from
PetSmart,90 another noteworthy campaign was a wolf pack led by Starboard
Value, which succeeded in replacing Darden Restaurant’s entire board of
directors.91 Starboard was busy in 2014, beginning eighteen new
campaigns that year.92 This includes Starboard’s effort to merge Staples
and Office Depot,93 which resulted in Staples’s $6.3 billion offer to acquire
Office Depot.94
Not all activist campaigns, however, have been viewed so kindly.
Pershing Square Capital took a substantial stake in pharmaceutical company
Allergan in an effort to pressure Allergan into a hostile takeover by Valeant
Pharmaceutical—a company notorious for cutting the research and
development departments of its acquisitions.95 This campaign led to
85. See Richard Lee & Jason D. Schloetzer, Director Notes: The Activism of Carl Icahn
and Bill Ackman 3 (The Conference Board, Working Paper No. DN-V6N10, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442317 [https://perma.cc/3KB8-KJNF].
86. See id. (noting that in 2013, activists targeted forty-two companies with a market
capitalization of $10 billion, compared to only seventeen companies in 2010).
87. See id. at 2.
88. See id.
89. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8.
90. See supra notes 13–14.
91. See Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing
Darden Board, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activist-hedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacingdarden-board/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E6GQ-H3BH]. This endeavor left the world with the
gift of the infamous, nearly 300-page long PowerPoint criticizing, among other policies,
Olive Garden’s unlimited breadsticks. See David Benoit, Starboard’s Olive Garden Slides:
Salting the Water, Custom Straws and More, WALL STREET J.: MONEYBEAT (Sept. 12, 2014,
12:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/12/starboards-olive-garden-slidessalting-the-water-custom-straws-and-more/ [https://perma.cc/TQ4P-G9WK].
92. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 14.
93. See John Jannarone, Starboard Letter Urges Staples to Merge with Office Depot,
CNBC (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:33 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/20/starboard-letter-urgesstaples-to-merge-with-office-depot.html (purchasing a 6.1 percent stake in Staples and a 9.9
percent stake in Office Depot) [https://perma.cc/9HP5-43PJ].
94. See Taryn Luna, Staples’ Merger with Office Depot Faces Antitrust Questions, BOS.
GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/09/09/staplesproposed-merger-with-office-depot-faces-antitrust-questions/fvzf4Ri783iiaR757tTPsL/
story.html [https://perma.cc/K6FH-BFRJ].
95. See Steve Denning, Case Study: Activist Hedge Funds in Practice—Bill Ackman,
FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/
2015/02/15/case-study-activist-hedge-funds-in-practice-bill-ackman/
[https://perma.cc/
JU7B-HX4D]; Richard Rubin, Ackman ‘Wolf Pack’ Sent Allergan to Foreigners, Ex-CEO
Says, BLOOMBERG:
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (July 30, 2015, 11:14 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/ackman-s-wolf-pack-sent-allergan-toforeign-hands-ex-ceo-says [https://perma.cc/4TFQ-4PVU]. Pershing Square’s stake was 9.7
percent of Allergan. Id.

2346

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Allergan’s acquisition by white knight96 Actavis, a foreign pharmaceutical
company, for $66 billion.97 Although the acquisition was friendly, many
were angry that Pershing Square drove Allergan to a foreign corporation,
and investors felt slighted because they sold their shares to the hedge fund
without knowing about the upcoming takeover.98
In addition to upset investors, hedge fund activism is not without its
critics. Legal experts, most notably Martin Lipton, contend that hedge fund
activism weakens the long-term value of targeted corporations.99 These
critics claim that hedge funds are interested in short-term gains and, thus,
make short-term changes without thought for their long-term effects—such
as cutting a target’s research and development budget before selling their
However, research has yet to validate these claims.101
stock.100
Conversely, proponents of activism point to studies demonstrating that
hedge fund interventions raise the long-term value of target corporations.102
Those legal scholars who argue over the long-term value of activism are
the same ones that debate the usefulness of activists themselves. Supporters
of activism claim that activists are a check on executives while critics
contend that activism scares management away from making smart longterm corporate decisions.103 Regardless of these arguments, the increase in
activism has led to greater dialogue between companies and their
shareholders, a generally beneficial consequence.104
C. Group Formation Under Section 13(d)
Investors commonly interact with one another. Determining that a group
exists is difficult because of the normalcy of discussion among similarly
situated market actors who have no intention of working together. In the
preeminent group formation case, Morales v. Quintel Entertainment,
Inc.,105 the Second Circuit held that investors are a group for purposes of
section 13(d) when they act together, or “agree[] to act together[,] for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, voting[,] or disposing of” an issuer’s

96. A “white knight” refers to the acquiring company in a friendly takeover as a
response to saving a corporation in danger of a hostile takeover. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Lockup Option Defense to Hostile Corporate Takeover, 66 A.L.R. 4th 180, 2[a] (1988).
97. See Denning, supra note 95; Rubin, supra note 95.
98. See Denning, supra note 95; Rubin, supra note 95.
99. Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge
Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-fromactivist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/4TNA-CZL8]; see also Sharfman, supra note 59, at
103.
100. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 47.
101. For an extensive discussion of hedge fund activism and long-term value, compare
Bebchuk et al., supra note 50, at 1100 (providing empirical evidence of long-term value
creation), with Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 84 (discrediting Bebchuk’s study, and
arguing that long-term value is destroyed).
102. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 50, at 1105–06, 1155.
103. See Benoit & Monga, supra note 17.
104. See White, supra note 3.
105. 249 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2001).

2016]

THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF PACKS

2347

securities.106 Further, group members are not required to commit to an
agreement on specified terms; it is merely enough to share a common
objective regarding one of the above actions.107 Essentially, the agreement
must be to take concerted action for one of those purposes.108
Plaintiff-corporations must present direct or circumstantial evidence that
an agreement exists between group members.109 This agreement may be
“formal or informal, written or unwritten.”110 Courts generally are looking
for a “meeting of the minds” between group members.111 Determining
when a group exists is difficult for several reasons. First, whether a group
was formed is a question of fact in each case.112 Second, courts do not have
a checklist of factors to determine the existence of a 13(d) group.113
Finally, activist investors are not required to have identical goals on every
issue or even “march in lockstep” to be labeled a group.114
D. Consequences of Forming a Section 13(d) Group
The greatest threats to investors who form a group are litigation and
poison pills. However, activist hedge funds do not seem to fear going to
court115 because in the past, the SEC rarely scrutinized activist investors.116
Its approach generally has been hands-off.117 Nevertheless, the SEC
recently has revamped its efforts to investigate and enforce disclosure
regulations.118 In March 2015, the agency charged eight directors and
corporate fiduciaries with section 13(d) violations.119 More recently, the
SEC has begun investigating a number of activist hedge funds that it
believes formed 13(d) groups without filing a Schedule 13D.120
When hedge funds are sued for violating section 13(d), courts are
reluctant to hold that activists investing in the same target are an

106. Id. at 123–24; see also Morales v. Freund, 163 F.3d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1999).
107. See Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124.
108. See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kahan &
Rock, supra note 44, at 1079.
109. See Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1163.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124.
112. See Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124.
113. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
114. Schaffer ex rel. Lasersight Inc. v. CC Invs., LDC, No. 99 Civ. 2821 (VM), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24511, at *14, *33 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2002) (quoting Morales v. New Valley
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 470, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
115. See Lawrence Delevinge, Activist Hedge Funds Shrug Off SEC Collusion Inquiry,
CNBC (June 5, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/05/activist-hedge-fundsshrug-off-sec-collusion-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/K8MR-F228].
116. See Liz Hoffman et al., SEC Probes Activist Funds Over Whether They Secretly
Acted in Concert, WALL STREET J. (June 4, 2015, 4:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
sec-probes-activist-funds-over-whether-they-secretly-acted-in-concert-1433451205 [https://
perma.cc/D3VT-FGHF].
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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undisclosed group.121 Even if a court is willing to find that activist
investors formed a group, punishments for violating section 13(d) have
become relatively lenient: courts may enjoin defendants’ right to vote on
the shares they acquired or may order the group members to correct their
Schedule 13D disclosures.122 To receive an injunction, an issuer must
prove that it suffered irreparable harm123 and that “some cognizable danger
of recurrent violation[s]” exists.124 Further, in the case of a proxy contest,
an injunction is inapposite under section 13(d) when the necessary
disclosures were made “in sufficient time for shareholders to cast informed
votes.”125 This rule makes it difficult for an issuer to obtain an injunction
against group members from casting their votes.126 Moreover, courts are
likely only to order that defendants file an accurate Schedule 13D.127 The
lack of harsh punitive measures explains why activists do not fear litigation.
Regardless of judicial punishment, hedge funds seek to avoid 13(d) group
status because boards of target corporations utilize various defensive
maneuvers.128 In a wolf pack, no member holds enough stock to trigger a
poison pill individually.129 However, if classified as a group, pack
members may hold enough to trigger a standard pill.130
In Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,131 the Delaware Chancery Court
recently upheld a two-tiered poison pill that was adopted to fend off
activists.132 The pill could be triggered by passive investors, those who
disclose ownership by filing a Schedule 13G, when they acquired 20
percent of the corporation.133 For all other investors who must disclose
ownership by filing a Schedule 13D, including activists, the pill could be
triggered when they acquired 10 percent of the corporation.134 The court
specifically noted that this pill could combat the conscious parallelism that
was part of wolf pack activism, which helped the court reach its decision.135
121. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:
An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 691 (2007); Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at
1079.
122. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 286
(2d Cir. 2011); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Anticlimax in Long-Running CSX Railroad Court
Case, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (July 19, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/07/19/anticlimax-in-long-running-csx-court-case/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F655-FAQ7].
123. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 284–85 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S.
49, 57 (1975)).
124. Id. at 285 (quoting Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 59).
125. Id. at 287 (citing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980)).
126. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 41–42.
127. See id. at 42.
128. See supra notes 65–74.
129. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
130. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 31–32.
131. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
132. Id. at *20.
133. See id. at *10.
134. See id. The pill also features a one-year term and a “qualifying offer” exception. Id.
The court noted that the pill discriminated against activists, but held it was legal regardless.
Id. at *20.
135. See id. Carmen X.W. Lu argues that the Third Point decision suggests that the twotiered pill limits even relatively loose wolf packs. Carmen X.W. Lu, Comment, Unpacking
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This type of shareholders’ rights plan has become more common and has
been used by corporations such as Sotheby’s and Netflix.136
The two-tiered poison pill is not the only defense mechanism
corporations may utilize to fight off wolf packs. Latham & Watkins LLP
has designed a “standing” poison pill, which uses broad language that
applies to shareholders “acting in concert” or working “in conscious
parallelism.”137 Additionally, Fried, Frank, Shriver & Jacobson LLP has
reportedly developed a “window-closing” pill, whereby investors must file
a Schedule 13D within a time frame much shorter than the ten-day window
required by section 13(d).138 The window is shortened when investors pass
a threshold ownership level of 5.1 percent.139 With new defensive
mechanisms available for targeted corporations, it is more important than
ever to adopt a structured formula to understand when a 13(d) group is
formed.
II. SECTION 13(D) AND ANTITRUST LAW:
CATEGORIES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
This part looks to judicial interpretations of group formation and pricefixing conspiracies to show their similarities. Part II.A surveys section
13(d) precedent, and Part II.B investigates the use of circumstantial
evidence in proving an agreement under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
A. Section 13(d) Evidence of Group Activity
Courts tend to assign different weight to different categories of section
13(d) evidence. Part II.A.1 analyzes parallel purchasing as evidence of
13(d) group formation. Part II.A.2 examines communication between
alleged group members as circumstantial evidence. Similarly, Part II.A.3
evaluates representations to third parties that a group exists. Part II.A.4
investigates whether courts look to past relationships in 13(d) group cases.
Part II.A.5 explores circumstantial evidence of actions taken to affect the
corporate direction of the target company.

Wolf Packs, 125 YALE L.J. 773, 780 (2016). Lu writes that applying conscious parallelism
to wolf packs risks overregulating activist hedge funds. Id.
136. See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, M&A UPDATE: DELAWARE COURT
UPHOLDS SOTHEBY’S POISON PILL DEFENSE AGAINST ACTIVIST CITING “NEGATIVE CONTROL”
AS A CORPORATE THREAT (2014), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friendsmemos/delaware-upholds-sothebys-poison-pill-defense-against-activist-citing-negativecontrol-as-a-corporate-threat [https://perma.cc/D7R8-MY9B]; see also Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Netflix’s Poison Pill Has a Shareholder-Friendly Flavor, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K
(Nov. 6, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/netflixs-poison-pill-hasa-shareholder-friendly-flavor/ [https://perma.cc/L2H4-HKGR].
137. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 97 & n.240.
138. See id. at 97–98, 98 n.241.
139. See id. at 97–98. Unlike the two-tiered poison pill, it is unclear whether these two
newly developed pills would be valid, but should they be upheld they also would prove to be
effective wolf pack defenses. See id. at 98 n.241.
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1. Parallel Purchasing and Selling of a Target’s Stock
When courts decide issues of 13(d) group formation, they often look to
whether defendants engaged in parallel acquisitions or sales of stock.
Trading patterns among investors are circumstantial evidence of a group.140
This is because the purpose of the Williams Act is to require disclosure by
persons who have acquired a substantial interest in a company in a short
period of time.141 It is important to note that not all trades must be “in
sync” for parallel transactions to be strong evidence of coordination.142 In
nearly every case where powerful evidence of parallel purchasing has
existed, the court has held that a group was formed.143
One example is the preeminent wolf pack group formation case, CSX
Corp v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP.144 There, the
Second Circuit affirmed the Sothern District of New York’s decision that
activist hedge funds formed a group.145 The Southern District cited
“parallel proxy fight preparations” and “parallel investments in the same
company” as evidence of group formation in its decision.146 Judge Ralph
K. Winter—in his concurring opinion—stated that the parallel conduct was
the strongest evidence of group formation.147
To constitute parallel purchasing, the transactions must occur over a
relatively short period of time and involve a large number of shares.148 A
short period of time amounts to purchases and sales within the same days or
weeks.149 Transactions occurring over the course of a season or a month
are too far apart to be considered parallel.150 Similarly, purchasing a near
identical amount of a target’s shares evidences parallel purchasing.151
Furthermore, courts have cited a lack of parallel transactions as a rationale
140. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
141. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 8 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811,
2818.
142. Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994).
143. See Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95–96 (1st Cir. 1977); Triton
Energy Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14, *16; Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713
F. Supp. 612, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp. 661
F. Supp. 825, 832–34 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1343–44 (La. Ct.
App. 1995). But see Hallwood, 286 F.3d at 616, 618.
144. 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). For the facts of this case, see infra notes 167–80 and
accompanying text.
145. See CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 287–88, aff’g 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
146. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. at 554, aff’d, 654 F.3d 276.
147. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 309 (Winter, J., concurring).
148. See Breaud, 657 So. 2d at 1343; cf. K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F.
Supp. 756, 766 (D. Colo. 1983).
149. See Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994).
150. Cf. K-N Energy, Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 766.
151. See Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that a
group was formed when three investors purchased identical blocks of stock simultaneously);
Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp., 661 F. Supp. 825, 839 n.30 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (noting that when two shareholders crossed the 5 percent threshold as a group, one
owned 50,000 shares, and the other owned 50,025).
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for finding that no group exists.152 Therefore, parallel purchasing or selling
of a target’s stock is circumstantial evidence of a section 13(d) group.
2. Communication Between Purported “Group” Members
Communication between group members has been analyzed in several
different ways. Part II.A.2.a focuses on communication between alleged
group members about agreements and strategy. Part II.A.2.b addresses
discussions of the target’s value and purported group members’ holdings.
Part II.A.2.c analyzes whether sharing information is circumstantial
evidence. Part II.A.2.d considers whether issuances of support for an
activist campaign constitute evidence.
Part II.A.2.e examines
communication regarding displeasure with incumbent management.
Finally, Part II.A.2.f evaluates whether discussions to avoid triggering
poison pills are circumstantial evidence of 13(d) group activity.
a. Communication Regarding Agreements and Strategy
Where alleged group members discuss their agreement, the court likely
will determine that a group was formed. This type of communication has
been evidence of group activity since the earliest 13(d) cases.153
Perhaps the most obvious example of group formation occurred in
Bender v. Jordan.154 There, a director who owned 21 percent of
Independent Federal Savings Bank’s (IFSB) stock attempted to elect two
new directors to IFSB’s board.155 The incumbent management fought the
nominations by hiring a public relations firm to send letters to shareholders
urging them to vote for the current board at the next shareholders’
meeting.156 Further, a friend of the directors purchased 7.2 percent of
IFSB’s outstanding shares.157
However, the directors’ most flagrant violation of section 13(d) was their
plan to acquire a block of 9.47 percent of IFSB’s shares.158 Two
shareholders owned this block: one of them attended the meeting, and both
of them intended to vote for the minority slate.159 At 11:00 p.m. on the
night before the shareholder meeting, the directors contacted the attending
shareholder and offered to purchase his shares at a premium, conditioned on
his vote for the incumbent management.160 The day of the meeting, the
incumbent directors brought the shareholder to an expensive restaurant.161
There, the incumbent directors convinced him and the nonattending
shareholder to sell their block, conditioned on their vote for the incumbents’
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Dreiling v. Am. Online Inc., 578 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 106, 111 (7th Cir. 1970).
439 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2006).
See id. at 145, 147.
See id. at 149–50.
See id. at 152.
See id.
See id. at 153.
See id. at 152–53.
See id. at 153.
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slate later that day.162 The same friend who had purchased 7.2 percent of
IFSB’s shares agreed to purchase the block through a defendant-director to
avoid Office of Thrift Supervision163 oversight.164 Several hours later, the
block voted for the incumbent directors, who then won the proxy contest.165
The court held that the directors’ communications and subsequent scheme
to acquire a block of IFSB stock an hour before the shareholder meeting
evidenced the creation of a 13(d) group.166
Another case where defendants discussed agreements is CSX Corp.167 In
CSX Corp., two hedge funds—the Children’s Investment Fund
Management (TCI) and 3G Capital (3G)—coordinated purchases of CSX
Corporation stock to effectuate corporate governance changes and,
eventually, a proxy contest.168 TCI and 3G purchased cash-settled totalreturn equity swaps (TRSs) with various banks referencing CSX shares.169
Both TCI and 3G were aware that the banks, who were the “short” parties
to the TRSs, would likely purchase stakes in CSX that were approximately
equal to the size of the TRSs.170 Through TRSs and common stock, TCI
acquired approximately 14.1 percent of CSX, and 3G purchased 4.9
percent.171
The hedge funds began communicating in January 2007 when TCI sent a
fund under 3G’s control, which invested in TCI, a letter detailing
information about the industries in which TCI was investing, including
“U.S. transportation.”172 Alex Behring, 3G’s Managing Partner, contacted
Chris Hohn, the Manager of TCI, to acquire more information.173 In their
discussions, Hohn disclosed that TCI had invested in CSX.174 Additionally,
the court found that Hohn revealed the size of TCI’s stake in CSX.175
Shortly after the talks, 3G also began purchasing shares in CSX while
remaining in communication with Hohn by email.176 By February 22, the
two funds took a break from their purchasing until their managers met in
person on March 29.177 Later that day, 3G began purchasing more CSX
162. See id. at 153–54.
163. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is “the primary federal regulator of all
federal and state-chartered savings institutions across the nation that belong to the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF).” About, OFF. THRIFT SUPERVISION, https://
www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/ots.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.
cc/CH6B-XEDB].
164. See Bender, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
165. See id. at 154–55.
166. See id. at 162.
167. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.
2011).
168. See id. at 280.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 526,
532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 276.
172. See id. at 533.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 534.
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stock, which continued until April 18; during those three weeks, TCI
acquired a larger stake in CSX as well.178
On December 19, 2007, the two hedge funds filed a Schedule 13D
disclosing that they were a group and stating their intention to nominate a
minority slate of directors to CSX’s board.179 The Second Circuit held that
TCI and 3G, through their communications and coordinated interests, had
actually formed a group on April 10, 2007, when their combined stakes in
CSX crossed the 5 percent threshold, thereby requiring section 13(d)
disclosure.180 This case provides another example where communicating
about agreements is strong evidence of group formation.
Discussions of strategy often serve as the circumstantial, informal, and
unwritten evidence needed to sufficiently prove the existence of a 13(d)
group.
The District Court of Maryland held that family-member
shareholders constituted a 13(d) group because they held daily conference
calls to discuss their investment in and stock manipulation of a target
company.181 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
a 13(d) group existed from evidence of, inter alia, discussions between
shareholders about nominating directors and officers as they took control of
a target.182 The Southern District of California held that a shareholder
formed a group when he spoke to a foreign investment fund about replacing
an entire board with a proxy contest.183 To avoid a poison pill’s trigger
threshold, he negotiated—and eventually came to a deal—with the fund to
acquire stock on its behalf for the purpose of controlling the target
corporation.184 Additionally, the Southern District of New York held that a
group was formed when the manager of a private equity firm communicated
with the principal of a hedge fund regarding the merits of amending a
preferred stock agreement and decided their positions in upcoming
negotiations.185
However, discussing strategy does not always equate group formation.
Communications between investors regarding strategy, subsequent to a
successful effort to change management, have not been deemed evidence of
group activity.186 Further, in Third Point LLC, a director nominee—
178. See id.
179. See id. at 535–36.
180. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir.
2011).
181. Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982, at *59–61 (D.
Md. Mar. 28, 2014).
182. SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
183. Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichenstein, No. 96-0039-B(AJB), 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22362, at *9–10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996).
184. See id.
185. See Schaffer ex rel. Lasersight Inc. v. CC Invs., LDC, No. 99 Civ. 2821 (VM), 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24511, at *14–18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2002).
186. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002);
Transcript of Partial Testimony at 262, Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F.
Supp. 2d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 12LGHal1) [hereinafter Hallwood Mahowald
Testimony]. There, it was Bill Ackman, a notorious hedge fund activist and the manager of
Pershing Square Capital, who inquired about strategy. See id.; Katrina Brooker, Love Him or
Hate Him, Ackman Now Runs the World’s Top Hedge Fund, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Jan. 6,
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nominated by activist funds as part of a proxy contest—communicated his
go-private plan to the lead wolf and attempted to recruit additional investors
to back his plan.187 The court never questioned whether the wolf pack
Therefore, while communications between
constituted a group.188
shareholders regarding strategy do not automatically render them a group,
the courts generally have required these investors jointly to file Schedule
13Ds.
b. Communication Regarding Value of
and Holding Size in Target Company
Conversations about value and holding sizes, independent of strategy and
agreements, are less likely to constitute circumstantial evidence of group
activity. The Second Circuit seems to have held that discussions regarding
the value of a target’s shares are not sufficient evidence to prove group
formation, standing alone.189 In Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham
Partners,190 the Vice President of an alleged group member shared
investment information about the target’s value with a potential investor.191
This discussion of value and holdings did not persuade the Second Circuit
that a group existed.192
In CSX Corp., the Southern District of New York held that a group was
formed when two hedge fund managers stayed in touch for almost six
months to discuss their valuations of the target and thoughts on the
investment, despite having filed Schedule 13Ds independently.193 The
Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that these discussions, along
with evidence of parallel stock acquisitions, were sufficient to form a
group.194 It is unclear whether the Second Circuit began to place greater
significance on this type of conversation in the time between Hallwood
Realty Partners and CSX Corp. However, the decisions suggest that
discussions about value and holding size in a target company are not,
standing alone, enough to constitute a 13(d) group.
2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-06/love-him-or-hatehim-ackman-now-runs-the-world-s-top-hedge-fund [https://perma.cc/89SG-LZ87].
187. See Defendants’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions for
Preliminary Injunction at 32–33, Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL
1922029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2014) (No. 56880461), 2015 WL 1094677 [hereinafter Third
Point Brief].
188. See generally Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029.
189. See e.g., Hallwood Realty Partners, 286 F.3d at 618; see also Hallwood Mahowald
Testimony, supra note 186, at 258.
190. 286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 2002).
191. See id. at 617. There, Ackman told another investor his valuation of the target
company, the approximate size of Gotham’s holding, and the identity of other large
shareholders. Hallwood Mahowald Testimony, supra note 186, at 258–62.
192. See Hallwood Realty Partners, 286 F.3d at at 618; see also infra Part II.A.2.d
(discussing the facts of Hallwood Realty Partners).
193. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK), LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511,
533–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). These hedge funds were part
of a wolf pack.
194. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 284, aff’g 562 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
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c. Sharing Information
Activists who have taken a position in a target company generally may
share information about that company with other potential investors and
current shareholders. Courts have held that investors seeking changes in a
target corporation could share information without forming a group.195
Further, in K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co.,196 the court held that
when shareholders hold significant stock in a corporation, it may be
understood that they share information with each other without any
intention to form a group.197 Additionally, shareholders may distribute
information to other investors with the hope of gaining their support in an
activist campaign.198
Sharing nonpublic information is actually in an activist hedge fund’s best
interest to gain allies to back its campaign199 and is considered common
practice.200 Wolf pack members shared information with other hedge funds
in CSX Corp.201 In that case, prior to investing in CSX, TCI made
presentations regarding an investment in CSX.202 The court held that a
group was formed after finding that these pitches were intended to attract
hedge funds favorable to TCI’s efforts.203
Courts have found that sharing information about target companies,
along with other communications, is evidence of group formation.204
However, this is far from the common trend.205 This category of evidence
has become more important as hedge funds waging public campaigns
increasingly have shared information publicly.206

195. See e.g., Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982, at
*53–54 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014).
196. 607 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1983).
197. See id. at 767 (holding that 7 percent was a significant stake, and further, the person
sharing the information—while President of his company—had no power to acquire stock).
198. See id. at 766–67. This is true unless the lead work is making a tender offer for the
target; in that case the tipping is illegal under Rule 14e-3. See Coffee Jr. & Palia, supra note
11, at 35.
199. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 34.
200. See generally id.
201. See Pulliam et al., supra note 54.
202. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511,
525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011). Chris Hohn, the founder of
TCI, contacted a number of hedge funds and managers about CSX including Deccan Value
Advisors, Lone Pine Capital, 3G, Seneca, Icahn, and Atticus. See id. at 525. Only 3G, who
communicated further with TCI, was held to be a part of the group. See CSX Corp., 654 F.3d
at 284.
203. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
204. See Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994).
205. See, e.g., Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982, at
*53–54 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014).
206. See Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Investors Get a Welcome Seat at the Table, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALB%K (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/
activist-investors-get-a-welcome-seat-at-the-table.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FJB7-W9FQ].
Hedge funds do this by speaking to the media, creating websites, or writing letters to
management in their public filings. Id.
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d. Communication Regarding Support
for an Activist Campaign
Issuances of support for lead wolves are evidence of group activity, but
hold little weight. In Hallwood Realty Partners, the Second Circuit held
that no 13(d) group existed among shareholders who sought to remove the
general partner of Hallwood.207 Gotham, a hedge fund managed by Bill
Ackman, led the campaign by acquiring 14.82 percent of Hallwood’s
stock.208 Gotham was joined by Interstate, a registered financial advisor,
Private Management Group, Inc. (PMG), an investment manager, and EFO
Liberty, Inc. (EFO), a realty investment company.209 Interstate acquired 9
percent of Hallwood’s shares, PMG amassed 6.5 percent of Hallwood’s
stock, and EFO purchased 2 percent of Hallwood.210 Throughout the
campaign, a PMG representative contacted Ackman and Interstate’s
manager to share that PMG would support actions to “realize value.”211
Similarly, in MeVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. v. Millennium
Partners,212 Millennium, a real estate investment firm, and Karpus, a
registered investment advisor, sought to replace a venture capital fund’s
entire board in a proxy fight.213 During the campaign, Millennium acquired
6.7 percent of the target’s shares, while Karpus bought 3.9 percent.214 Over
ten months, Karpus representatives emailed Millennium six times and
called it once about its investment.215 In most of these emails, Karpus
informed Millennium of its general support for Millennium’s efforts to
upend the target’s board.216 The court held that these communications did
not sufficiently allege the existence of a 13(d) group.217
In a recent Delaware Chancery Court case, a hedge fund and the
Institutional Shareholder Services218 issued statements supporting a lead
wolf’s slate of directors in a proxy battle.219 The court did not address the
issue of whether the hedge funds were a group.220 Similarly, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that expressions of support, even when paired
207. Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 615, 618 (2d Cir.
2002).
208. See id. at 616.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Transcript of Partial Testimony at 335, 340, 347–49, 380, id. (No. 12L4HAL4)
[hereinafter Hallwood Reiland Testimony].
212. 260 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
213. See id. at 617, 619.
214. See id. at 618.
215. See id. at 632.
216. See id. at 632 n.28.
217. See id. at 632.
218. The “Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) is the world’s leading provider of
corporate governance and socially responsible investment (SRI) solutions for asset owners,
asset managers, hedge funds, and asset service providers.” About ISS, ISS, http://www.
issgovernance.com/about/about-iss/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/MKX9F5VZ].
219. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *12 n.5
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2014); Third Point Brief, supra note 187, at 60.
220. See Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1.
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with communicating dissatisfaction with management, does not make
investors a 13(d) group.221 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit held that
investors who expressed support for a shareholder’s plan to change
management were part of a group.222 These cases stand for the proposition
that communicating support for an activist campaign is circumstantial,
although weak, evidence of 13(d) group activity.
e. Communication Regarding Displeasure
with Incumbent Management
Discussions among shareholders who voice their dissatisfaction with a
target’s current management likely are not enough, standing alone, to form
a 13(d) group. Generally, courts have declined to find group formation
resting on this evidence.223 As stated in Part II.A.2.d, even criticism of
management paired with issuances of support is not enough to form a
group.224 Like evidence of support, communicating displeasure with
incumbent management has been evidence of group formation in prior case
law.225 However, it is clear that this evidentiary category is entitled to little
weight.226
f. Communication to Avoid Triggering Poison Pills
Discussions among shareholders to avoid triggering poison pills have not
been held to be evidence of 13(d) group activity. In Third Point LLC, Third
Point, an activist hedge fund managed by Dan Loeb, a prominent activist
investor, purchased shares in Sotheby’s.227 Third Point planned to take
Sotheby’s private and replace its directors with Loeb and his allies.228
Subsequently, a wolf pack was formed when two other hedge funds,
Marcato Capital Management LLC (“Marcato”) and Trian Fund
Management, L.P. (“Trian”) also purchased stock in Sotheby’s.229 Third
Point and Marcato eventually filed and amended separate Schedule 13Ds
until Third Point held 9.62 percent of Sotheby’s shares and Marcato owned
221. Quigley Corp. v. Karkus, No. 09-1725, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41296, at *11, *18
(E.D. Pa. May 15, 2009).
222. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 106, 112 (7th Cir. 1970), aff’g 305 F. Supp.
526 (E.D. Wis. 1969). There, however, the court found that the defendants also had made an
agreement to “pool” their shares, which ultimately led to the group holding. Id. at 104.
223. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002);
Charming Shoppes, Inc. v. Crescendo Partners II, 557 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 (E.D. Pa. 2008);
Hallwood Mahowald Testimony, supra note 186, at 258 (noting that Bill Ackman told the
vice president of an alleged group member that he “was not particularly fond of [the target’s]
management”).
224. See Quigley Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41296, at *18.
225. See, e.g., Bath Indus., Inc., 427 F.2d at 106. However, the court’s decision rested on
evidence that defendants agreed to pool their shares. Id. at 104.
226. See, e.g., id.
227. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *3–4 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2014).
228. See id. at *4.
229. See id. *3–4.
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6.61 percent.230 Additionally, Trian acquired approximately 3 percent of
Sotheby’s outstanding shares.231 Other hedge funds, such as York Capital
Management and Eton Park Capital Management joined the wolf pack by
acquiring Sotheby’s stock during this time.232
After the funds acquired significant positions in Sotheby’s, Third Point’s
Chief Operating Officer met with Marcato’s General Counsel to ensure that
the funds “didn’t do anything to inadvertently trigger the pill.”233 This
resulted in “some, but not extensive” communications between the two
hedge funds.234 The court in Third Point LLC affirmed the legality of using
the two-tiered poison pill to ward off activist campaigns addressed in Part
I.D of this Note.235 However, the court ignored a potential section 13(d)
issue, which implies that a group was not formed in this case.236 Similarly,
in Hallwood Realty Partners, defendant-shareholders discussed a target’s
poison pill.237 However, the court held that no group was formed.238 These
cases show that communication about poison pills, without further
discussions, does not require investors to disclose group membership under
section 13(d).
3. Representations to Outside Parties
That a Group Was Formed
Courts assign different weights to evidence that defendants
communicated with third parties.
Part II.A.3.a analyzes whether
referencing that a “group” was formed is circumstantial evidence of an
agreement. Part II.A.3.b examines the extent to which representations that
individually owned shares are part of a “block” qualifies as evidence of
group activity.

230. See id. at *4, *12.
231. See id. at *6 (filing a Schedule 13D was unnecessary because Trian never surpassed
the 5 percent threshold).
232. See Svea Herbst-Baylss & Siddharth Cavale, UPDATE 1-Hedge Fund Manager
Loeb Launches Proxy Battle at Sotheby’s, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2014, 4:45 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/27/thirdpoint-sothebys-idUSL3N0LW4WO201402
27#8M56SW7eI1JQ0d2u.97 [https://perma.cc/3U82-QB3Z].
233. See Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029, at *11.
234. See id.
235. See supra Part I.D; supra notes 132–36; Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029, at
*20. While the poison pill prevented Third Point from acquiring a larger stake, the wolf
pack proved effective: Sotheby’s settled with Third Point and expanded its board by adding
Loeb and his two director nominees. See David Benoit & Sara Germano, Sotheby’s, Third
Point Reach Settlement: Sotheby’s Board Expanded; Daniel Loeb, Olivier Reza, and Harry
Wilson Appointed, WALL STREET J. (May 5, 2014, 7:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303647204579543581203051454
[https://perma.cc/K4WTXP9X].
236. See Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1.
237. See Hallwood Mahowald Testimony, supra note 186, at 263.
238. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F. Supp. 2d 169 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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a. Referencing a “Group” to a Third Party
Courts tend to find that a group has been formed where there is evidence
that defendants represented that they were a “group” to third parties. An
example of this occurred when a shareholder publicly stated that a “group”
was formed with the intent to take control of a target.239 Similarly, where
four directors sought to acquire their corporation with a shell company and
filed a joint Schedule 13D to that end, the court held that the directors
violated section 13(d) by not filing earlier.240 The court held that the
defendants formed a group when they revealed their takeover plan to the
remaining directors at a board meeting.241 Finally, where a letter to a
corporation’s stock transfer agent represented that a group of individuals
had purchased warrants from a single issuer on the same date, the court held
that this was sufficient proof of group formation.242
However, several courts have held that no group existed in cases where
defendants represented themselves as a “group.” In Transcon Lines v. A.G.
Becker, Inc.,243 Becker Warburg Paribus Group Inc. (BWP), a securities
broker, sought to acquire an interest in Transcon with the help of Jerry G.
Rubenstein, a controlling shareholder of shipping and management
companies.244 Rubenstein and BWP met with many major corporations,
seeking additional funding for the acquisition.245 In each meeting, the
potential investors were told that Rubenstein would be involved in
Transcon’s future management.246 This was reflected in a number of
internal documents that included Transcon financial projections with
references to Rubenstein and his associates’ involvement in
management.247 Other documents stated that “Rubenstein-BWP,” a
partnership between Rubenstein and BWP, would be part of the
acquisition.248 Despite these representations, the court held that Rubenstein
was not part of a group with BWP because he was not a beneficial owner of
Transcon stock, and the group disclosed him as an advisor in their Schedule
13D.249
Similarly, in Hallwood Realty Partners, where several hedge funds and
investment advisors sought to remove a target company’s general partner,
the target hired a private investigator (PI) to gather evidence of group
activity from alleged group members.250 One of the defendants told the PI,
239. See Hollywood Casino Corp. v. Simmons, No. 3:02-CV-0325-M, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13182, at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2002).
240. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 50, 60 (D.N.J. 1974).
241. See id. at 59–60.
242. See Podesta v. Calumet Indus., Inc., No. 78 C 1005, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17847,
at *8, *37 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1978).
243. 470 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
244. See id. at 359–61.
245. See id. at 361.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 379.
248. Id. at 362.
249. See id. at 371, 374.
250. Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 616–17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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who was posing as a prospective investor, that a “Gotham-led group
designed to take over” the target existed.251 Another defendant gave the PI
investment materials about the target that “could be read to imply that [the
defendant-investment advisor] was part of a Gotham-led attempt . . . to take
over [the target] and to ‘realize value.’”252 The court held that this
circumstantial evidence was not enough to find that a group had been
formed.253 Transcon Lines and Hallwood Realty Partners stand for the
proposition that in some cases, defendants’ representations alone that a
“group” exists is not enough to prove 13(d) group formation.
b. Representations That Shares
Owned by Individuals Are Part of a “Block”
The Fifth Circuit held that a mark of group formation is statements to
outside parties by group members “that its members together ‘control’ a
block of shares, even though those shares are on the record of the company
as owned by individual group members.”254 District courts have expressed
this sentiment as well.255
In Wellman v. Dickinson,256 defendant-shareholders sought to interest
major corporations to acquire a minority interest in a target to affect a
complete takeover.257 The defendant made identical presentations to
several companies, whereby stocks owned by one of the defendants, a
brokerage house, and the defendants’ friends were advertised as a “block”
that “would provide a sufficient base from which to launch a more
extensive acquisition” of the target’s shares.258 The court relied on these
representations to potential investors as proof of a 13(d) group.259
Overwhelming precedent shows that statements that shares owned by
individuals are part of a “block” is evidence of a 13(d) group.260
4. Past Relationships Indicative of a “Group”
The majority of courts do not consider past relationships between
defendants when deciding the issue of 13(d) group formation. In Texasgulf,
Inc. v. Canada Development Corporation,261 the Southern District of Texas
formulated the prevailing rule that “[m]ere relationship[s], among persons
or entities, whether family, personal[,] or business, [are] insufficient to
create a group which is deemed to be a statutory person. There must be [an]
251. Id. at 617.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 618.
254. Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
255. See Simon Prop. Grp., Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); see also Jewelcor Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
256. 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982).
257. Id. at 356–57.
258. Id. at 359.
259. See id. at 363.
260. See, e.g., id.
261. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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agreement to act in concert.”262 Most courts have adopted this rule
verbatim when faced with similar section 13(d) questions.263 Still others
convey this same principle with different language.264
Further, courts generally show no bias in considering the type of
relationship between defendants as evidence of group formation. This lack
of bias is illustrated by courts’ holdings in different cases that a group did
or did not exist when the relationship at issue was between friends,265
family,266 clients,267 coworkers,268 or colleagues from separate
companies.269 Interestingly, the Southern District of New York has
recently stated that an employer-employee relationship is not indicative of
group membership either.270 Further, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
has declared that being Facebook “friends” is not significant to group
formation.271
Although courts generally show no preference regarding the type of
relationship between defendants, this does not prevent some courts from
placing significance on evidence of prior relationships. For example, the
District Court of Maryland, in Burt v. Maasberg,272 adopted the Texasgulf
rule,273 but then stated that past relationships are circumstantial evidence
that may be used to show group membership.274 Additionally, the Northern

262. Id. at 403.
263. See, e.g., Forward Indus. v. Wise, No. 14-cv-5365 (JSR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144030, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2014).
264. See In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Torchmark
Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F. Supp. 1070, 1083 (W.D. Mo. 1988); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf
Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Colo. 1983).
265. Compare Quigley v. Karkus, No. 09-1725, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41296, at *12,
*18 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2009) (holding that no group existed between friends), with
Hollywood Casino Corp. v. Simmons, No. 3:02-CV-0325-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13182,
at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2002) (holding that friends formed a group).
266. Compare Torchmark Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1072, 1083 (holding that no group
existed between family members), with Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 41982, at *3, *55 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014) (holding that family members formed
a group).
267. Compare Bayly Corp. v. Marantette, No. 82-1354, 1982 WL 1337, at *4, *13
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982) (holding that no group existed between stockbroker and customer),
with Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, No. 96-0039-B(AJB), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22362, at *10–12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996) (holding that shareholder and clients
formed a group).
268. Compare K-N Energy, Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 759, 767 (holding that management of a
company was not a group), with Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 51–52, 58
(D.N.J. 1974) (holding that directors of the same corporation formed a group).
269. Compare Texasgulf, Inc. v. Can. Dev. Corp. 366 F. Supp. 374, 387, 404–05 (S.D.
Tex. 1973) (holding that no group existed between two mining companies), with Schaffer ex
rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508,
at *1, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1994) (holding that separate hedge funds formed a group).
270. Forward Indus. v. Wise, No. 14-cv-5365 (JSR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144030, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2014).
271. Quigley Corp. v. Karkus, No. 09-1725, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41296, at *16–17,
*17 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2009).
272. No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014).
273. See id. at *53.
274. See id. at *54.
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District of Texas has contemplated prior relationships while determining
group formation.275
The Southern District of New York has been inconsistent in considering
prior relationships as evidence of group activity, and the Second Circuit has
done little to clear up the confusion. Most Southern District cases
contemplating the issue have applied the Texasgulf rule and have not used
relationships as evidence.276 However, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the
Southern District has implied that “pre-existing common relationship[s]”
are a relevant consideration in determining group formation.277
Additionally, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, also of the Southern District, has
twice considered relationships between shareholders as evidence in
deciding group membership.278 The Second Circuit has not explicitly
approved the use of prior relationships as circumstantial evidence, but it has
addressed it before.279 In Hallwood Realty Partners, the Second Circuit
seemingly signed off on Judge Kaplan’s consideration of past relationships
as evidence of a group.280 And in CSX Corp., the majority opinion did not
address this issue, but Judge Winter’s concurrence stated that the
relationship between the defendants was evidence of group formation.281
Nonetheless, Judge Winter cautioned that this evidence should be balanced
by the idea that it is “an explanation for frequent conversations that do not
involve [the target].”282 Therefore, a discrepancy exists between whether
past relationships are circumstantial evidence at all.
5. Actions Taken to Affect the
Corporate Direction of the Target Company
Some courts use “action[s] taken by the group to affect the corporate
direction of the company” as evidence of group formation.283 An example
of an activity undertaken to affect the corporate direction of a target that
275. Hollywood Casino Corp. v. Simmons, No. 3:02-CV-0325-M, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13182, at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2002).
276. Forward Indus., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144030, at *7; Triton Energy Corp., 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *11; Transcon Lines v. A. G. Becker, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 356,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
277. Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 411 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing
Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc. 249 F.3d 115, 127 (2d Cir. 2001)) (distinguishing the present
case from Quintel Entertainment, where Judge Hellerstein stated that the court took
relationships into consideration). Interestingly, the Second Circuit’s Quintel Entertainment
opinion does not seem to address the defendants’ relationship in its consideration of group
status. See 249 F.3d at 127.
278. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533–34
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
279. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309 (2d
Cir. 2011) (Winter, J., concurring); Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d
613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
280. Hallwood Realty Corp., 286 F.3d at 618.
281. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 309 (Winter, J., concurring).
282. Id.
283. Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Simon Prop. Grp.,
Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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was sufficient enough to be evidence of a group occurred when activist
shareholders vetoed a profitable offer to purchase a company.284 Further,
efforts to direct a target into a new industry have constituted evidence of
group activity.285 Finally, seeking a company to effectuate a takeover of a
target corporation has been sufficient evidence to warrant a holding that
shareholders were a group.286 Although it is considered infrequently,
conduct to affect a target’s direction is evidence of a 13(d) group.
B. Proving an Agreement by Circumstantial Evidence
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act
As noted in Part I.C, courts making Williams Act determinations do not
follow a defined set of factors. Looking to the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which contains a more rigid and developed factor-based system of analysis,
can guide courts through group formation cases alleging section 13(d)
violations.
To prevent cartel price-fixing schemes, section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act makes “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce . . . illegal.”287 Congress intended this statute to ensure that
business markets remained competitive.288 Antitrust litigation often
focuses on whether defendants formed an agreement.289 Beginning in the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court developed the “agreement” issue by
defining concerted action.290 In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,291
the Court stated that an “agreement . . . [is] not a prerequisite to an unlawful
conspiracy. It [is] enough that, knowing that concerted action [is]
contemplated and invited, the distributors [give] their adherence to the
scheme and participate[] in it.”292 Further, a competitor’s acceptance of a
plan, without a formal agreement, is enough to form a conspiracy under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.293 A decade later, the Supreme Court echoed
this rule, holding that “it is not necessary to find an express agreement in
order to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is
contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.”294
Therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to circumstantial
evidence in price-fixing cases.
More recently, in Monsanto Co v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,295 the Court
held that evidence must exist that “tends to exclude the possibility of
284. See Breaud, 657 So.2d at 1344; Simon Prop. Grp., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
285. See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1164–65 (D.D.C. 1978).
286. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363–64 (2d Cir. 1982).
287. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
288. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 491–95, 493 n.15 (1940).
289. See Kovacic et al., supra note 20, at 399.
290. See id.
291. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
292. Id. at 226.
293. See id. at 227.
294. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); see also Am.
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946).
295. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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independent action.”296 This requires “direct or circumstantial evidence” to
prove that that parties “had a conscious commitment to a common
scheme.”297 The “tends to exclude” standard was significant because the
Court sought to prevent the mistaken interpretations of conspiracy that
would deter companies from offering low prices and thereby hurt
consumers.298
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the key question in antitrust
cases is “whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct stem[s] from
independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.”299 Proving
the existence of an agreement by direct evidence is rare; far more often, an
Using
agreement is shown through circumstantial evidence.300
circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs generally must show that defendants
acted in conscious parallelism.301 Conscious parallelism means that
companies intentionally espouse the practices of their competitors.302
Showing conscious parallelism requires plaintiffs to prove two elements:
that defendants engaged in similar acts and that they were conscious of their
actions.303 Evidence of conscious parallelism does not require that pricing
be uniform; price changes may occur nonsimultaneously and need not be
the same between competitors.304
The Supreme Court held that allegations of conscious parallelism are not
enough to prove a conspiracy, standing alone.305 Plaintiffs must also prove
plus factors—evidence that “tends to exclude” the probability that
defendants acted independently.306 Generally, more than one plus factor
must be shown to prove that a conspiracy exists.307 Courts are given broad
discretion to determine plus factors,308 as there is no all-inclusive list.309

296. See id. at 768.
297. See id.
298. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593–94
(1986).
299. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007). The court looks for a
“meeting of the minds.” Id. at 557.
300. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 56.
301. See id. at 63. The Supreme Court has stated that “evidence of consciously parallel
behavior . . . [has] made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspirac[ies].” Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954).
302. See Dennis D. Palmer & Adam K. Fuemmeler, Motions to Dismiss in Parallel
Conduct and Plus Factors: Antitrust Cases After Twombly and Iqbal, 2012 LEXISNEXIS
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 6240, http://www.polsinelli.com/~/media/Articles%
20by%20Attorneys/Palmer_Fuemmeler_Parts12 [https://perma.cc/2VRX-K6Y6]. Courts
also have called this “tacit collusion.” See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 63 n.61;
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55 (2d ed. 2001).
303. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 63, 65. However, courts rarely address
these elements independently. Id. at 65.
304. See Palmer & Fuemmeler, supra note 302, at 6.
305. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54, 556–57, 561 n.7 (2007).
306. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69.
307. See id. at 68.
308. See Kovacic et al., supra note 20, at 405.
309. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69.
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Given that plus factors still can be somewhat ambiguous, it can be difficult
to prove concerted action in the antitrust context.310
This section focuses on nine common plus factors: the eight common
plus factors that the American Bar Association (ABA) has identified—(1)
“actions against the defendant’s independent self-interest,” (2) “motive to
conspire,” (3) “opportunity to conspire,” (4) “market concentrations and
structure,” (5) “pretextual explanations for anticompetitve conduct,” (6)
“sharing of price information,” (7) “signaling,” and (8) “involvement in
other conspiracies”311—as well as legal scholars Phillip E. Areeda and
Herbert Hovenkamp’s plus factor, (9) “customary indications of traditional
conspiracy.”312
The plus factor “actions against the defendant’s independent selfinterest” is evidence of a conspiracy when an action would be against a
company’s interest acting independently, but would be in its interest while
acting in a conspiracy.313 This plus factor is important because its presence
generally removes the risk of misidentifying a competitive market as a
cartel.314 An example of this plus factor evincing a conspiracy is two
companies abstaining from competing to steal each other’s customers.315
Despite this, courts recognize that actions against a company’s self-interest
are sometimes only a sign of interdependence.316
Like conduct against a defendant’s independent self-interest, the plus
factor “motive to conspire” is important because its existence lessens the
chance of mistaking a noncompetitive market as competitive.317 However,
courts are skeptical of this plus factor, so it is rarely alleged standing
alone.318 This skepticism is due to motivation to conspire being
synonymous with interdependence.319 For this reason, courts hold that
oligopolists may raise their prices with the hope that others will follow,
without giving rise to an inference of conspiracy.320 Further, to be a plus
factor, the defendant’s motive must be more than a wish to increase
profits.321

310. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1079.
311. Id.; ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69–91.
312. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1434b, at 267–68 (3d ed. 2010). This
Note will not focus on Judge Richard A. Posner’s suggested plus factors because they
generally pertain to price fixing specifically, however the ABA addresses some of his
factors. See POSNER, supra note 302, at 79–93.
313. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69–70.
314. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 312, at 265–66.
315. See Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1244–46 (3d
Cir. 1993).
316. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 312, at 269–70.
317. See id. at 265.
318. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 74.
319. See id.
320. See, e.g., In re Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
321. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 74.
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“Opportunity to conspire” generally means meetings or conversations
between defendants.322 Oftentimes, plaintiffs allege this plus factor when
defendants attend the same trade association meetings,323 although this plus
factor is given little weight.324 The Supreme Court dismissed the
proposition that membership in the same trade association was, standing
alone, a sufficient plus factor to evidence a conspiracy.325 Lower courts
have echoed this sentiment for several decades.326 Nonetheless, if alleged
with other plus factors, many courts still believe it is circumstantial
evidence of a conspiracy.327
The Supreme Court has stated that the “structure of the industry” is one
of the “most prominent[]” factors used to identify a conspiracy.328 While
this plus factor, standing alone, is not enough to prove conspiracy,
combined with other plus factors, it is probative evidence.329 Judge
Richard A. Posner also recognizes “market concentration and structure” as
evidence of conspiracy: he argues that “fixed relative market shares” is
proof of noncompetitiveness.330 This plus factor is particularly evincing of
a conspiracy in sell-side markets.331 Nonetheless, courts generally hold that
just because a market is an oligopoly does not necessarily mean that there
has been a conspiracy.332 To prove that a market’s concentration and
structure are susceptible to collusion, plaintiffs must show a market is
concentrated and has “fungible products subject to inelastic demand.”333
Evidence of “pretextual explanations for anticompetitive conduct” refutes
the possibility of independent action.334 An illustration of a pretextual
explanation that can serve as a plus factor is a defendant’s explanation for
refusing to sell a product because of a distributorship agreement, followed
by an explanation that the refusal was not because of an agreement, but
because the defendant had a policy not to sell products outside its
territory.335 However, this plus factor alone generally is insufficient to
show a conspiracy.336

322. See id. at 76.
323. See id. at 77.
324. See id. at 76.
325. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 n.12 (2007).
326. See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 293–94 (5th
Cir. 1988).
327. See, e.g., In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1017 (E.D. Mich.
2010).
328. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978).
329. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 78.
330. See POSNER, supra note 302, at 79. Fixed market shares occur within an industry
when large companies maintain near identical market shares relative to each other for a
considerable amount of time. Id.
331. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 78.
332. See id. at 80.
333. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
334. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 81.
335. See Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1986).
336. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 81.
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“Sharing of price information,” in certain situations, is strong
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy.337 However, the Supreme Court
held that sharing price data is not a per se violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act338 because exchanging information also can indicate
competitive action.339 But systems of price sharing are more likely to be
evidence of a conspiracy,340 so long as evidence that defendants agreed to
fix prices also exists.341 The Court did not explain a “system” beyond the
facts of the case, but Merriam-Webster defines “system” as “a group of
related parts that move or work together.”342 Lower courts have held that
systems of price sharing can refer to the authority level of the
representatives of each defendant exchanging information.343 Where the
price sharing occurs at higher levels, it is more indicative of a conspiracy
than an exchange between employees, who do not have the authority to
make pricing decisions.344 Significantly, in examining price sharing, courts
will also look to whether there is a “legitimate, nonpretextual business
rationale” for the exchange to rebut allegations of conspiracy.345
The plus factor “signaling” occurs when companies transmit pricing
information or competitive plans to their coconspirators through indirect
communications, including third parties and the media.346 Sometimes,
conferences with industry analysts have proved to be evidence of the
signaling plus factor.347 However, in Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris
USA,348 the Eleventh Circuit held that no conspiracy existed when a
defendant’s CEO announced the defendant’s plan to adopt a strategy other
than price reductions at a conference with stock analysts.349 Two reasons
for the holding, among others, were that: “in an oligopoly, each company is
aware of the others’ actions,” and the announcements neither eliminated the
chance of independent action nor substantiated a price-fixing conspiracy.350
Under the signaling plus factor, courts scrutinize price increase

337. See id. at 83.
338. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978).
339. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 84.
340. See POSNER, supra note 302, at 87.
341. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 84; see also United States v. Container
Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336–37 (1969). There, the Supreme Court held that a system
whereby defendants exchanged prices upon request, with the recognition that each defendant
would provide data in return, was evidence of a conspiracy where there was additional
evidence that the system had a negative effect on the market. Id.
342. System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/system [https://perma.cc/89BS-MU7Q].
343. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 369 (3d Cir. 2004).
344. Compare id. (holding that a conspiracy existed when higher-ups exchanged pricing
data), with In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 125–26 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that information exchange by a lowly salesman working for a defendant was not evidence of
a conspiracy).
345. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 85.
346. See id. at 87.
347. See id. at 88.
348. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
349. See id. at 1305.
350. See id. at 1305–06.
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announcements that occur far before changes are implemented.351
However, like the “sharing price information” plus factor, defendants can
rebut this scrutiny by showing a legitimate business rationale for their
announcements.352
While plaintiffs have alleged that “involvement in other conspiracies”
should be considered in antitrust cases, courts are skeptical of this plus
factor’s usefulness.353
Further, the Supreme Court stated that “a
conspiracy . . . in one market does not tend to show a conspiracy” in other
markets if the “conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible
explanations.”354 Therefore, this plus factor provides little strength to
plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations.
The plus factor “customary indications of traditional conspiracy” refers
to proof that alleged conspirators met and “exchanged assurances of
common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no
meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents are shown.”355 This plus
factor has led at least one court to infer a conspiracy existed when
defendants had simultaneous meetings and then implemented a set formula
for bidding on contracts.356 This plus factor also sufficiently proved a
conspiracy where defendants exchanged salary information and assured
each other that they were going to rely on that information.357 “Customary
indications of traditional conspiracy” provide strong circumstantial
evidence of conspiracy.
While these plus factors are not bright-line rules, they have proven to be
a sufficient framework in price-conspiracy cases. The strength of antitrust
conspiracy law is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s continued reliance
on conscious parallelism and plus factors.
III. SECTION 13(D) GROUP FORMATION SHOULD BE
ANALYZED USING THE ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY FRAMEWORK
This part argues that 13(d) group formation cases should be examined
under the antitrust conspiracy framework. Part III.A suggests that the
antitrust precedent of conscious parallelism should be adopted as the first
element in determining that a wolf pack forms a 13(d) group. Part III.B
evaluates antitrust plus factors and 13(d) group evidence to propose plus
factors that should be used in section 13(d) cases.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

See POSNER, supra note 302, at 87.
See id.; ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 88.
See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 89.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596 (1986).
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2004); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 312, at 267–68.
356. See Alexander v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 989, 999 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
357. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
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A. Adopting the Conscious Parallelism Standard
As the First Element in a Wolf Pack Group Formation Rule
While there currently is no “checklist” of factors to determine 13(d)
group formation,358 the substantial increase in hedge fund activism,
specifically the wolf pack tactic,359 requires the development of a clearer
rule. The conscious parallelism and plus factor standard of circumstantial
evidence from antitrust law provides the more certain solution that section
13(d) needs.
Rule 13d-5(b)(1) states that a 13(d) “group” is formed “[w]hen two or
more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
voting or disposing of . . . securities.”360 Similarly, section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act makes “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce . . . illegal.”361 The Supreme Court held that
in deciding whether a conspiracy exists, the key question is “whether the
challenged anticompetitive conduct stem[s] from independent decision or
from an agreement, tacit or express.”362 Both the 13(d) and antitrust
standards require an agreement to be formed.
Quintel Entertainment, the preeminent 13(d) group case, states that an
agreement can be “formal or informal.”363 Further, group members must
only “combine[] to further a common objective” regarding “acquiring,
holding, voting, or disposing of . . . securities”—specific terms are
unnecessary.364 Likewise, antitrust conspiracies only require that a concert
of action be intended and that defendants conformed to the understanding;
they do not require an express agreement.365 Both standards essentially
require a “meeting of the minds.”366 Additionally, both rules may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.367
Conscious parallelism is implicit in both standards. The wolf pack tactic
requires parallel investing strategies, usually ones that involve buying up a
target’s stock in a short window of time.368 And in antitrust law, “evidence
of consciously parallel behavior . . . [has] made heavy inroads into the
traditional attitude toward conspirac[ies].”369 Even the level of parallel
behavior required is equivalent. Under section 13(d), actors do not need to
“march in lockstep,” and their parallel trades need not be “in sync” to be
strong evidence of coordination.370 Antitrust conscious parallelism does

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See supra text accompanying notes 112–13.
See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 2.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).
Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
See supra text accompanying notes 106–07.
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).
See supra notes 111, 299 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109, 297 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 52, 62–64.
Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
See supra text accompanying notes 114, 142.
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not require that pricing is uniform; price increases can occur
asynchronously, and raised prices can differ.371
In nearly every case where strong evidence of parallel purchasing was
present, courts have held that a 13(d) group was formed.372 Further, in CSX
Corp., the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s
decision, which recognized parallel behavior as evidence of group
activity.373 Circuit Judge Winter’s concurrence stated that the parallel
conduct was the strongest evidence of group formation.374 Given conscious
parallelism’s implicit role in wolf packs and courts’ willingness to treat this
behavior as strong evidence of group formation, it seems natural to adopt it
as the first element in a clearer rule.
The Delaware Chancery Court has been willing to treat wolf packs
differently than other investors in the past. In Third Point LLC, the court
noted that the two-tiered poison pill discriminated against activist
shareholders, but held that it was still appropriate.375 Further, the court
recognized that conscious parallelism was a fundamental part of the wolf
pack strategy; this fact helped the court come to its decision.376
The wolf pack strategy’s ability to evade traditional group formation has
led the Delaware Chancery Court to treat wolf packs differently than
traditional investors. Similarly, the court may be willing to adopt the
antitrust precedent in wolf pack group formation cases to address this
loophole.
Nevertheless, the antitrust-securities comparison is not perfect: though it
creates more certainty than the status quo 13(d) group formation analysis,
the plus factors are not bright-line factors.377 But given the nature of the
issue, it is unlikely any solution will get closer to an objective test.
Moreover, judges have experience implementing the antitrust framework
and thus could apply it adeptly to the section 13(d) context. Further, it has
been suggested that using conscious parallelism to determine group
formation overestimates the extent of agreements among activist hedge
funds, leading to the overregulation of wolf packs.378 However, this Note’s
proposed plus factors seek to identify clear behavior that avoids
overpunishing wolf packs.379 Therefore, this Note suggests that no plus

371. See Palmer & Fuemmeler, supra note 302, at 6.
372. See supra Part II.A.1. Further, courts have held that a lack of parallel transactions
was evidence that no group was formed. See Dreiling v. Am. Online Inc., 578 F.3d 995,
1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
373. See supra text accompanying notes 144–46.
374. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309 (2d
Cir. 2011) (Winter, J., concurring).
375. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
376. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Nos. 9469-VCP, 9497-VCP, 9508-VCP, 2014 WL
1922029, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 309–10.
378. See Lu, supra note 135, at 780.
379. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
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factor alone—except “customary indications of traditional conspiracy”380—
is enough to show that a wolf pack formed a group.381
B. Plus Factors to Serve As the Second Element in the
Proposed Wolf Pack Group Formation Rule
This section analyzes plus factors that could serve as the second element
in the proposed 13(d) group formation rule. Part III.B.1 suggests that
several preexisting antitrust plus factors should be adopted in 13(d) group
cases. Part III.B.2 recommends applying previously used circumstantial
evidence of group activity to the proposed section 13(d) plus factor
analysis. Finally, Part III.B.3 rejects certain antitrust plus factors that are
irrelevant in 13(d) group formation cases.
1. Proposed Plus Factors to be Adopted from Antitrust Law
Part III.B.1.a argues that the antitrust plus factor “opportunity to
conspire” should be adopted in section 13(d) law. Part III.B.1.b proposes
that the plus factor “sharing of price information” deserves evidentiary
weight as a 13(d) plus factor. Part III.B.1.c suggests that the plus factor
“signaling” is relevant to this consideration as well. Finally, Part III.B.1.d
notes the obvious benefits of adopting “customary indications of traditional
conspiracy” as a section 13(d) plus factor.
a. Opportunity to Conspire
In antitrust practice, “opportunity to conspire” is relevant where alleged
conspirators meet or communicate.382 In the context of 13(d) group
formation, these situations are more likely to occur when alleged group
members have prior relationships. Past relationships should be evidence of
group activity because they create an opportunity to conspire.
Most courts dealing with prior relationships cite the Texasgulf rule and
do not seem to contemplate this factor while making group formation
decisions.383 However, several courts—particularly two judges in the
Southern District of New York—do consider this factor even though they
also cite Texasgulf.384 To reconcile the discrepancies between the courts,
prior relationships should be circumstantial, but weak, evidence of “group”
membership.
The language of the Texasgulf rule—“mere
relationship[s] . . . [are] insufficient to create a group”385—implies that,
standing alone, this evidence is not enough to prove group formation. The
language leaves open the possibility of considering relationships as just one
factor in this determination.
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381.
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See infra Part III.B.1.d.
See infra Part III.B.1.a–c, III.B.2.
See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 76.
See supra text accompanying notes 262–63.
See supra text accompanying notes 274–78.
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Can. Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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However, courts analyzing this factor should also consider Judge
Winter’s point that prior relationships may be “an explanation for frequent
conversations that do not involve [the target].”386 Consideration that prior
relationships often foster communication that is not just for investment
reasons prevents relationships from being a sufficient plus factor to show a
group was formed, on their own.
In antitrust cases, plaintiffs often allege that defendants have an
opportunity to conspire when they attend the same trade association
meetings.387 Trade association meetings are similar to activist investor
conferences; they give activist hedge funds an opportunity to meet and
communicate about their investments.388 The Supreme Court’s holding that
membership in a trade association is not, alone, a sufficient plus factor to
show a conspiracy reinforces this proposed 13(d) group plus factor.389 Like
prior relationships, attending activist conferences should be weak
circumstantial evidence of group activity. Due to its similarity to section
13(d) case law, the antitrust evidence “opportunity to conspire” should be
adopted as a plus factor in the wolf pack group formation framework.
b. Sharing of Price Information
The plus factor “sharing of price information” should be circumstantial
evidence of 13(d) group formation. In antitrust law, systems of price
sharing are likely to evince a conspiracy.390 The definition of “system” is a
group that moves or works together.391 The same principle should apply in
section 13(d) cases where there is additional evidence that an agreement
took place. Like antitrust precedent,392 arrangements whereby activist
investors provide information to other activists upon request and an
understanding exists that those activists will furnish data in return should
certainly be considered in a court’s decision of group formation.
Communication regarding value and holding size in a target and sharing
information about a target are analogous to the antitrust “sharing of price
information” plus factor. However, courts are split on whether these types
of communication are evidence of group activity.393 Therefore, this
suggested plus factor in wolf pack 13(d) group formation cases should not
be enough, standing alone, to prove the existence of an agreement.
Courts hearing antitrust cases distinguish systems of information sharing
between high-ranking employees from systems between low-ranking
employees.394 In antitrust cases, higher-ups are management or employees
386. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309 (2d
Cir. 2011) (Winter, J., concurring).
387. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 77.
388. See generally Alden, supra note 56.
389. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 n.12 (2007).
390. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.
391. See System, supra note 342.
392. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text.
393. See supra Part II.A.2.b–c.
394. See supra notes 343–44 and accompanying text.
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who have authority to make pricing decisions.395 In applying this
distinction to hedge funds, it should be stronger evidence of price sharing if
systems involve managers and analysts who have authority to make
investment decisions. Because sharing information is not a per se violation
of antitrust or securities law,396 this plus factor, standing alone, should not
be enough to prove group formation.
In the context of hedge fund activism, this plus factor is appropriate
because hedge funds invest large amounts of capital in target companies—
clearly the decisions by high-ranking members with this sort of authority
are determinative. An investor generally will seek to acquire as much
information as possible about a corporation before purchasing stock,
especially when making a large investment.
In antitrust law, defendants can rebut the presumption of conspiracy
created by exchanging price information if they show a legitimate,
nonpretextual business reason for sharing.397 This is similar to the K-N
Energy principle that significant shareholders may exchange information
without forming a group.398 There, the defendant had a 7 percent stake in
the target.399 By comparison, news of most activist hedge fund campaigns
do not reach the public,400 which means that no wolves acquire more than 5
percent of their target. Thus, in the majority of activist campaigns, hedge
funds will not be able to rebut the presumption of group activity created by
sharing information because there is no documentation of earlier statements
regarding the reason for business decisions. In the rare situation that a wolf
takes a 5 percent or larger stake—and must file Schedule 13Ds—the
target’s board of directors will be aware of the activists’ presence and can
inform shareholders accordingly, thus satisfying the purpose of section
13(d).401 Whether the K-N Energy principle should apply to those activist
hedge funds that reach 7 percent of a target’s stock should depend on
whether the campaign will provide long-term value to the target.402 Despite
this determination, communication about the value of and the holding size
in a target and sharing information should fall under the “sharing
information” plus factor in analyzing wolf pack group formation. However,
it must be alleged with other plus factors.

395. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
396. See supra Part II.A.2.c; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
441 n.16 (1978).
397. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 85.
398. See K-N Energy, Corp. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756, 767 (D. Colo.
1983).
399. See id.
400. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8.
401. For the purpose of section 13(d), see supra text accompanying notes 32–34.
402. See K–N Energy Corp., 607 F. Supp. at 767. As it is still unclear whether hedge
fund activism provides long-term value to target corporations, this Note does not address
whether to extend the K-N Energy, Inc. safe harbor to these investors.
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c. Signaling
“Signaling” has been alleged to be circumstantial evidence of price
fixing, especially where defendants made announcements at conferences
Evidence of communicating support for
with industry analysts.403
campaigns, references that a “group” exists, and representing that shares
owned by individual shareholders are part of a “block” have all been used
These types of
as evidence in 13(d) group formation cases.404
communications are analogous to “signaling” that an activist campaign
exists. Therefore, signaling should be a plus factor in determining 13(d)
group membership. However, as courts seemingly assign little weight to
communications of support,405 this plus factor should not be enough,
standing alone, to show group activity.
In antitrust law, announcements at conferences with industry analysts are
evidence of the plus factor “signaling.”406 This is similar to the antitrust
practice of treating attendance at trade association meetings as
circumstantial evidence under the “opportunity to conspire” plus factor.407
For this reason, courts should hold that presentations at activist conferences
are analogous to announcements at conferences with industry analysts. In
contrast, Williamson Oil Co. disregarded these announcements as evidence
of price fixing.408 However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning does not fit
perfectly in securities law. Its first rationale, “that in an oligopoly, each
company is aware of the other’s actions,”409 is not relevant to wolf packs
because they do not control the majority of a target’s shares. However, the
court’s second rationale is relevant because, like price fixing, presenting at
activist conferences does not exclude the possibility of independent action
nor establish that a group is formed.410 This further supports the contention
that signaling, on its own, should not prove 13(d) group formation.
Defendants can rebut the presumption of signaling as evidence of price
fixing by showing there was a legitimate business rationale for their
actions.411 Adopting this defense in section 13(d) cases would protect
shareholders with ethical intentions. Activist hedge fund campaigns
targeting poorly run companies would be able to present evidence that their
proposals would benefit the target—and hopefully provide long-term value.
The only actors that would be barred from this defense are those taking part
in activist campaigns against perfectly healthy and well-run targets;
presumably these investors would have no excuse.
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See supra text accompanying notes 346–47.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.d, II.A.3.a–b.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.d.
See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 88.
See id. at 77.
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Adopting this plus factor in section 13(d) cases would have a substantial
effect on wolf packs because tipping is an essential part of their strategy.412
An argument that this plus factor hurts shareholders’ fundamental right to
support better management decisions likely will fail. Traditional activist
shareholders—as apart from activist hedge funds—would benefit from
disclosure because the issuer’s board, and presumably other shareholders,
would be made aware of their campaign. Further, this plus factor would not
hurt traditional activists because they and their allies generally do not hold a
5 percent stake in an issuer.413 It is more likely that this plus factor will
apply to wolf packs than traditional investors. By signaling instead of
making express agreements, wolf packs circumvent section 13(d)’s
disclosure requirements; thus, the law’s purpose is not being carried out.
Activist hedge funds in a wolf pack with moral intentions still could plead
the legitimate business rationale defense. Therefore, signaling should be a
plus factor in 13(d) group formation cases, but should be considered
alongside other plus factors.
d. Customary Indications of Traditional Conspiracy
“Customary indications of traditional conspiracy” is the most easily
recognizable form of price-fixing evidence. Similarly, evidence that wolf
pack members adopted a common plan, regardless of whether a meeting
took place, is easily recognizable. In cases where there is evidence of
communications about agreements and support, courts overwhelmingly
hold that a 13(d) group is formed.414 Given that this evidence clearly shows
group formation, it is the exact type of behavior that Congress believed
should be disclosed. Customary indications of traditional group formation
should therefore be a plus factor that holds substantial weight.
2. Proposed Plus Factors from Section 13(d) Case Law
Part III.B.2.a proposes using evidence of communicating dissatisfaction
with management as a section 13(d) plus factor. Part III.B.2.b suggests that
discussions to avoid triggering a poison pill also should be a plus factor.
Finally, Part III.B.2.c recommends that actions taken to affect the corporate
direction of a target should be a 13(d) group plus factor.
a. Communication Regarding Displeasure
with Incumbent Management
Expressing dissatisfaction with management should be a plus factor
because it is circumstantial evidence of group activity.415 Courts have
declined to find that a 13(d) group was formed from evidence of this type of
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See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58.
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.e.
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communication, yet they have considered it in their decisions.416
Nonetheless, displeasure with an issuer’s management neither discounts
independent action nor substantiates group membership.
Further,
disgruntled shareholders may not believe that an activist campaign provides
a better alternative to current management decisions. Dissatisfaction with
management direction is implicit in all activism. Therefore, it is weak
circumstantial evidence.
The nature of wolf packs—as compared to traditional shareholders—
requires that expressing dissatisfaction with incumbent management is a
plus factor. First, shareholders—like a wolf pack—that acquire 5 percent or
more of an issuer have a louder voice than the traditional shareholder.
Further, a fundamental part of a wolf pack is campaigning that its proposal
is a better alternative to a target’s current management’s practices. Because
courts are willing to treat wolf packs differently than traditional
shareholders, evidence that activist hedge funds express displeasure with a
target’s management should be a plus factor, but it should still hold little
weight.
b. Communication to Avoid Triggering Poison Pills
Evidence that shareholders spoke to avoid triggering a poison pill should
be a 13(d) group formation plus factor because it provides an opportunity to
come to an agreement. A shareholder would only buy a stake just short of
triggering a pill if they intended to take control of the issuer. However,
courts must consider that shareholders with a stake this large would worry
about a pill being triggered and, therefore, likely would believe it is
necessary to communicate with other parties to protect their investment.
In section 13(d) cases where plaintiffs cited this form of communication
as evidence of group membership, courts did not address this factor in their
analysis.417 One reason for this may be that a party close to the pill’s
threshold would have already had to file a Schedule 13D. This satisfies the
purpose of section 13(d): that the board of directors would be aware of the
party’s stake and could advise other shareholders accordingly.418 Another
reason is that a discussion to avoid triggering a poison pill with nothing
more evinces that the parties are not fully aware of each other’s intentions.
Therefore, while this form of communication should be a plus factor, it
should be considered weak circumstantial evidence.
c. Actions Taken to Affect the
Corporate Direction of the Target Company
Actions to affect the corporate direction of a target should be a plus
factor because they occur in all wolf packs. Several courts have considered
416. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.e.
417. See, e.g., Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F. Supp. 2d 169
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hallwood Mahowald Testimony, supra note 186, at 263.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.
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these actions, on their own, to be evidence of group activity.419 In all of
these cases, the actions taken were the same types that are sought by activist
hedge fund campaigns.420
This plus factor may seem too broad because taking actions to affect a
corporation’s direction is implicit in all activism. However, it is essential
for shareholders to know about these actions to make informed decisions
regarding their shares. This is the exact type of knowledge that Congress
intended shareholders to have.421 This plus factor is particularly relevant
because wolf packs have recently had so much success in implementing
changes.422 Therefore, this plus factor should be considered weak
circumstantial evidence of group activity.
3. Rejection of Irrelevant Antitrust Plus Factors
While Part III.B.1 of this Note reconciled the similarities between
antitrust plus factors and 13(d) group evidence, some antitrust plus factors
are irrelevant in the context of 13(d) group formation.
The first unnecessary plus factor is “actions against self-interest.” In
antitrust cases, one common reason that plaintiffs are unable to prove a
conspiracy exists is that the defendant’s acts may not necessarily be against
their own self-interest, and thus, the evidence would not meet Monsanto’s
“tend to exclude” standard.423 This same rationale is present in all hedge
fund activism: all hedge funds share the same interest in making a profit.
When a normal actor invests in a poorly run company, one may be able to
show that the investment was not in the actor’s interest. However, activist
hedge funds seek out poorly run companies, so it becomes difficult to show
that an investment is not in a hedge fund’s interest. Even if it were possible
to show this, in corporate law, courts employ the business judgment rule to
give deference to board business decisions because courts operate under the
assumption that judges are not the best suited to decide investment matters.
Therefore, the plus factor “actions against self-interest” has no place in
13(d) group formation.
The plus factor “motive to conspire” is also irrelevant in section 13(d)
cases. In antitrust law, courts express skepticism toward “motive to
conspire” because these claims may be nothing more than evidence of
interdependence.424 For this reason, courts hold that there is no inference of
a conspiracy when an oligopolist raises prices in the hope that his
competitors also will do so.425 Similar to an oligopoly, hedge fund activism
requires some level of interdependence because no hedge fund takes a
419. See Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1344 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Simon Prop. Grp.,
Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
420. See discussion supra Part II.A.5; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
421. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971).
422. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
423. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
424. See supra text accompanying notes 318–19.
425. See, e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
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controlling stake in the target. The presence alone of other activist hedge
funds can be enough to give the lead wolf leverage. Therefore, arguing that
activist hedge funds have a motive to form a group simply points out that
activist campaigns require interdependence. Additionally, in antitrust law,
a motive to profit is not evidence of a conspiracy.426 Activist hedge funds
may seek to implement changes in their targets, but their underlying
motive—and the reason for their existence—is to increase their profits.
Therefore, “motive to conspire” cannot be a 13(d) group plus factor.
The plus factor “market concentration and structure” also does not
translate to section 13(d) cases. In antitrust law, evidence of market
concentration and structure is relevant where alleged conspirators make up
a majority of the market and have relatively fixed shares.427 In that
situation, the market is more susceptible to price fixing, especially on the
selling side.428 Whether a product is infungible is also important to this
consideration.429 A wolf pack does not take a controlling share in its
targets, so it does not make up a majority of the market for those
corporations’ stock. Further, hedge funds are on the buy side of the market,
and their ability to purchase more shares means that the market for shares of
the target’s stock is not fixed. Similarly, as any investor can buy a target’s
outstanding stock, shareholders may be considered fungible themselves.
Therefore, “market concentration and structure” is irrelevant in 13(d) group
formation.
“Pretextual explanations” also has no place in 13(d) group cases. Most
activist hedge fund campaigns are not public knowledge.430 Smaller
activist hedge funds can remain silent and allow the lead wolf to
communicate with the target’s management.431 Oftentimes, lead wolves
have a preconceived notion of the change they would like to implement in
the target, however, they are free to pursue a different change if they see
value. Therefore, what may seem to be evidence of pretextual explanations
is actually a change in direction. This remains true if an activist hedge fund
announces its investment to the public. It is only when a shareholder
crosses the 5 percent threshold and must file a Schedule 13D that it is
required to state a purpose.432 At that point, an investor is required to
amend its Schedule 13D whenever their purpose changes.433 If it does not
amend its Schedule 13D, yet changes the purpose for its investment, section
13(d) is violated and the target—or its shareholders—may bring suit. In
that situation, pretextual explanations will be evidence of a section 13(d)
violation, but they will not be evidence of group formation. Therefore,
“pretextual explanations” should not be a 13(d) plus factor.
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The plus factor “involvement in other conspiracies” has no place in 13(d)
group formation. Even in antitrust law, courts are reluctant to consider
involvement in other conspiracies as evidence of price fixing.434 The
Supreme Court has gone so far as to reject evidence of a different
conspiracy as holding weight in later antitrust cases.435 Like antitrust law,
13(d) group formation cases require another conspiracy-like determination.
Given courts’ skepticism of this plus factor, it makes little sense to apply it
to wolf pack formation cases.
CONCLUSION
The recent growth in hedge fund activism, specifically the wolf pack,
necessitates a clear formula for determining when a 13(d) group is formed.
The antitrust doctrine, conscious parallelism—used to discover conspiracies
that are analogous to section 13(d)’s agreement requirement—should be
applied in wolf pack group formation cases. Under the proposed section
13(d) framework, to show group activity, a plaintiff would need to show the
first element—conscious parallelism—and plus factors to prove that
defendants agreed to act for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or
disposing of securities.
Opportunity to conspire, sharing of price information, signaling, and
customary indications of traditional conspiracy are plus factors that should
be adopted from antitrust law. Additionally, communication regarding
displeasure with management, discussions to avoid triggering a poison pill,
and actions taken to affect the corporate direction of a target are all
circumstantial evidence that should be adopted as plus factors in 13(d)
group cases. Finally, the antitrust plus factors actions against self-interest,
motive to conspire, market concentration and structure, pretextual
explanations, and involvement in other conspiracies serve no use in wolf
pack 13(d) cases and thus should be discarded. Adopting the antitrust
framework would provide clearer factors to guide courts in dealing with
wolf pack group formation.

434. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 89.
435. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596 (1986).

